How to talk to multiple audiences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:536082
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.007zbMath1236.91030OpenAlexW2149409067MaRDI QIDQ536082
Maria Goltsman, Gregory Pavlov
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70367
Related Items
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