Influence functions, followers and command games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003zbMath1236.91021OpenAlexW3125396508MaRDI QIDQ536083

Agnieszka Rusinowska, Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

influence functionkernelcommand functioncommand gamefollower functionlower and upper inversesminimal sets generating a command game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (11)

From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements ⋮ Opinion dynamics and wisdom under conformity ⋮ A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations ⋮ Game theoretic interaction and decision: a quantum analysis ⋮ Anonymous social influence ⋮ A model of influence based on aggregation functions ⋮ Values for Markovian coalition processes ⋮ A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions ⋮ Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games ⋮ Indirect control and power in mutual control structures ⋮ Lattices in Social Networks with Influence

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