The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral \(k\)-double auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002zbMath1236.91078OpenAlexW3125356108MaRDI QIDQ536085

Thomas A. Gresik

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

affiliationdouble auctionsstatistically dependent valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions1