Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.012zbMath1236.91033OpenAlexW2158214458MaRDI QIDQ536088

Ziv Hellman

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp522.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

common priorsiterated expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites Work

• The veil of public ignorance
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Agreeing to disagree
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• Markov chains and invariant probabilities
• The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Quantified beliefs and believed quantities