Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.008zbMath1236.91079OpenAlexW2143763840MaRDI QIDQ536096

Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designasymmetric auctionsprocurementrho-concavitysecond price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic models in economics (91B70) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction

Cites Work

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• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

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