Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003zbMath1236.91037OpenAlexW2080077874MaRDI QIDQ536102

Muhamet Yildiz, Jonathan Weinstein

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

sensitivityrobustnessincomplete informationuniversal type spacehigher-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms, Invariance to representation of information, Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity, A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games, An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences, Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty

Cites Work

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• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model