A robustness result for rationalizable implementation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.001zbMath1236.91076OpenAlexW2049895732MaRDI QIDQ536103

Alfredo Di Tillio

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationmechanism designcommon knowledgerationalizabilityrobust implementationhigher-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Robust Mechanism Design
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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