Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:536104
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.003zbMath1236.91109OpenAlexW2170610265MaRDI QIDQ536104
Noriaki Matsushima, Toshihiro Matsumura
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.b.kobe-u.ac.jp/papers_files/2009_05.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Spatial models in economics (91B72)
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Cites Work
- Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome.
- The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity
- Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
