An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.8zbMath1372.91051arXiv1406.3278OpenAlexW2950712789MaRDI QIDQ5363023

Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Publication date: 5 October 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.3278

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (20)

Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue ⋮ Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer ⋮ On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design ⋮ The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer ⋮ Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ Bayesian auctions with efficient queries ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions ⋮ Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods ⋮ An $O(\log \log m)$ Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions

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