On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.9zbMath1372.91047arXiv1404.2041OpenAlexW2949060750MaRDI QIDQ5363024

Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 5 October 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2041

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (6)

Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy ⋮ Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding ⋮ Optimization with demand oracles ⋮ Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations ⋮ Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission ⋮ Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round

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