Robust Price of Anarchy Bounds via LP and Fenchel Duality

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.70zbMath1372.91016OpenAlexW4240466343MaRDI QIDQ5363045

Janardhan Kulkarni, Vahab S. Mirrokni

Publication date: 5 October 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.70

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Convex programming (90C25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Linear programming (90C05) Games involving graphs (91A43) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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