Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973730.126zbMath1372.91073arXiv1407.2640OpenAlexW2949424511MaRDI QIDQ5363111

Zhiwei Steven Wu, Jamie Morgenstern, Aaron Roth, Sampath Kannan

Publication date: 5 October 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.2640

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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