ENTRY AND QUALITY SIGNALLING WHEN ONLY SOME CONSUMERS ARE INFORMED OF THE ENTRANT'S QUALITY

DOI10.1111/BOER.12026zbMATH Open1372.91043OpenAlexW1899612144MaRDI QIDQ5364919

Fulan Wu

Publication date: 29 September 2017

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/boer.12026

zbMATH Keywords

entryunprejudiced beliefsquality signalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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