scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783426
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Publication:5365074
zbMath1377.91102MaRDI QIDQ5365074
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Tim Roughgarden
Publication date: 29 September 2017
Full work available at URL: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2133091
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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