Adopting the Cascade Model in Ad Auctions: Efficiency Bounds and Truthful Algorithmic Mechanisms

DOI10.1613/jair.5438;zbMath1425.91192MaRDI QIDQ5370987

Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://jair.org/index.php/jair/article/download/11067/26247/

zbMATH Keywords

sponsored search auctionsalgorithmic mechanismsgeneralized second priceVickrey-Clarke-Groves auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (3)

Assortment optimization with position effects under the nested logit model ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions

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