A social choice theory of legitimacy
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Publication:537545
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0509-yzbMath1232.91601OpenAlexW2069994264MaRDI QIDQ537545
John W. Patty, Elizabeth Maggie Penn
Publication date: 20 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0509-y
Cites Work
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- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
- Choice by elimination
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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