A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0514-1zbMath1232.91602OpenAlexW2098166286MaRDI QIDQ537551

John E. Roemer

Publication date: 20 May 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0514-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (2)

Endogenous party platforms: `stochastic' membership ⋮ The convergence coefficient across political systems

Cites Work

• A model of political parties
• Voting over income taxation
• Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

This page was built for publication: A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters