Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking

DOI10.1080/10920277.2015.1017110zbMath1414.91228OpenAlexW1958163944MaRDI QIDQ5379145

Victor I. Oguledo, Colin M. Ramsay

Publication date: 28 May 2019

Published in: North American Actuarial Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/10920277.2015.1017110

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddisability insuranceabsenteeismpresenteeism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (3)

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Cites Work

• The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s
• On blocked Poisson processes in risk theory
• The asymptotic ruin problem when the healthy and sick periods form an alternating renewal process
• Mathematical optimization and economic analysis
• The price of worker reliability
• Multistate models in health insurance
• Computational Methods for Integral Equations
• Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking
• A First Course in Optimization Theory
• Determining the Optimum Guarantee Period for a One-Life Retirement Annuity
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