Effects of Competition on Insurance Contract Formation

DOI10.1080/10920277.2016.1191995zbMath1414.91226OpenAlexW2505738706MaRDI QIDQ5379194

Zhan Shen, April Shen, Joseph Qiu, Michael R. Powers

Publication date: 28 May 2019

Published in: North American Actuarial Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/10920277.2016.1191995

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalityinsurance contract formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

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• Optimal risk sharing with background risk
• Are generalized call-spreads efficient?
• Non-cooperative games
• A strategic market game with price and quantity strategies
• Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games
• Insuring Nonverifiable Losses*

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