CARNAP’S DEFENSE OF IMPREDICATIVE DEFINITIONS

DOI10.1017/S1755020318000370zbMath1411.00028OpenAlexW2903353012MaRDI QIDQ5381037

Vera Flocke

Publication date: 7 June 2019

Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000370

zbMATH Keywords

philosophy of mathematicsCarnapprinciple of toleranceimpredicative definitionsmetaontologymathematical ontology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Combinatory logic. With two sections by William Craig.
• Carnap's early metatheory: scope and limits
• Why ramify?
• Carnap's dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein, and \textit{Logical Syntax}
• Carnap and logical truth
• Carnap, Quine, Quantification and Ontology
• On Gödel's Way In: The Influence of Rudolf Carnap
• Predicative Fragments of Frege Arithmetic
• On the Concept of Following Logically
• Hitting a Moving Target: Gödel, Carnap, and Mathematics as Logical Syntax†
• Leon Chwistek, The Principles of the Pure Type Theory (1922), translated by Adam Trybus with an Introductory Note by Bernard Linsky
• Carnap's Noncognitivism about Ontology
• Speaking of Everything
• Carnap, completeness, and categoricity: The Gabelbarkeitssatz of 1928
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