The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973402.96zbMath1421.68060arXiv1211.1703OpenAlexW2951509365MaRDI QIDQ5384058

Christos Tzamos, Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum

Publication date: 20 June 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.1703

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

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