An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games

DOI10.1142/S0219198919400012zbMath1417.91034OpenAlexW2922122445MaRDI QIDQ5384711

Giulia Bernardi, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 25 June 2019

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919400012

zbMATH Keywords

votingaxiomspower indicesgames with abstention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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