Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information
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Publication:538480
DOI10.1007/s00291-010-0212-5zbMath1222.91032OpenAlexW2104553198MaRDI QIDQ538480
Sabine Böckem, Ulf D. Schiller
Publication date: 25 May 2011
Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/312986/files/291_2010_Article_212.pdf
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Cites Work
- Ignorance in agency problems
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability
- Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
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