Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0218-ZzbMath1229.90070OpenAlexW2059979979MaRDI QIDQ538487

Thorsten Döscher, Gunther Friedl

Publication date: 25 May 2011

Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0218-z

zbMATH Keywords

corporate governanceboard dependenceexecutive compensationstakeholder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Cites Work

• Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

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