On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0220-5zbMath1222.90021OpenAlexW2020181879MaRDI QIDQ538488

Jacco L. Wielhouwer, Anja De Waegenaere

Publication date: 25 May 2011

Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0220-5

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelcompensationoptimal contractreporting flexibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Cites Work

• Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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