Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0176-6zbMath1213.91025OpenAlexW2082505783MaRDI QIDQ538506

Bryan C. McCannon

Publication date: 25 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0176-6

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionfictitious playcoordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

The emergence of cooperation through leadership

Cites Work

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