Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
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Publication:538506
DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0176-6zbMath1213.91025OpenAlexW2082505783MaRDI QIDQ538506
Publication date: 25 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0176-6
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