Core Stability of Minimum Coloring Games

DOI10.1287/moor.1060.0187zbMath1276.91035OpenAlexW2158538549MaRDI QIDQ5387989

Thomas Bietenhader, Yoshio Okamoto

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0187

zbMATH Keywords

stable setcoreminimum coloring game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Coloring of graphs and hypergraphs (05C15)

Related Items (9)

Component Acquisition Games ⋮ Minimum coloring problems with weakly perfect graphs ⋮ Simple and three-valued simple minimum coloring games ⋮ Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ On the cores of games arising from integer edge covering functions of graphs ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ Fair cost allocations under conflicts - a game-theoretic point of view - ⋮ Monotonic stable solutions for minimum coloring games ⋮ On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability

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