Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
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Publication:5387998
DOI10.1287/moor.1060.0207zbMath1278.91107OpenAlexW2140384255MaRDI QIDQ5387998
Chung-Piaw Teo, Jay Sethuraman, Liwen Qian
Publication date: 27 May 2008
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0207
fairnesslinear programmingrandomized roundingstable matchinguniversity admissionstwo-sided marketmatching with couples
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