Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

DOI10.1287/moor.1060.0248zbMath1276.91021OpenAlexW2101418681MaRDI QIDQ5388038

Tristan Tomala, Olivier Gossner

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/6817

zbMATH Keywords

entropystochastic processsignalssecret correlationmin-max values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (18)

The complexity of interacting automata ⋮ When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? ⋮ Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games ⋮ Correlation through bounded recall strategies ⋮ Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory ⋮ Playing games with bounded entropy ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ Informationally optimal correlation ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Simulation of a Random Variable and its Application to Game Theory ⋮ Persuasion with limited communication capacity ⋮ Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality

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