COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198910002659zbMath1209.91025OpenAlexW2040293411MaRDI QIDQ5392795

Ryusuke Shinohara

Publication date: 14 April 2011

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002659

zbMATH Keywords

aggregative gamescoalition-proof equilibriumstrategic substitutabilitymonotone externalityno unilateral benefit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
• Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
• On games with identical equilibrium payoffs

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