On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00654.xzbMath1112.91024OpenAlexW2123831269MaRDI QIDQ5393885

Aviad Heifetz, Zvika Neeman

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp350.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

faceprevalencegenericityuniversal type spaceshynesssurplus extractioninformation rents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Spaces of measures, convergence of measures (28A33) Convergence of probability measures (60B10)

Related Items (28)

Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces ⋮ Common belief foundations of global games ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ Local openness: characterization of a robustness concept for generic sets in function spaces ⋮ Impact of higher-order uncertainty ⋮ Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction ⋮ Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Surplus extraction with rich type spaces ⋮ The e-mail game phenomenon ⋮ Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes ⋮ Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design ⋮ The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited ⋮ Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments ⋮ Full surplus extraction from samples ⋮ On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction ⋮ Revealed reasoning ⋮ Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

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