Adaptive Heuristics

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Publication:5393888

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00625.xzbMath1152.91370OpenAlexW4230129716MaRDI QIDQ5393888

Sergiu Hart

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00625.x




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