Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

DOI10.1007/s10100-010-0142-yzbMath1213.91034OpenAlexW2045254580MaRDI QIDQ539469

Ferenc Forgó

Publication date: 30 May 2011

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0142-y

zbMATH Keywords

correlationNash equilibriumprotocolbehavioral strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (2)

Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games ⋮ Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game

Cites Work

• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
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• An O(n) algorithm for the multiple-choice knapsack linear program
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
• Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games

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