SOME EXCESS-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITY

DOI10.1142/S021919891340029XzbMath1287.91016OpenAlexW2089191117MaRDI QIDQ5396047

Krishna Chaitanya Vanam, Nandyala Hemachandra

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891340029x

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecost sharingnucleolusmin-maxcoalitional monotonicityapproximate core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Individual weighted excess and least square values

Cites Work

• The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
• The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games
• Core and monotonic allocation methods.
• Cores of convex games
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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