An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
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Publication:5397567
DOI10.3982/ECTA6995zbMath1304.91080OpenAlexW2166421991WikidataQ57568067 ScholiaQ57568067MaRDI QIDQ5397567
Publication date: 24 February 2014
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6995
perfect Bayesian equilibriumdynamic mechanism designbudget balancedynamic incentive compatibilityfolk theorems with private informationMarkov games with private information
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Continuous-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces (60J27)
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