The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
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Publication:540600
DOI10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7zbMath1213.91075OpenAlexW2079466096MaRDI QIDQ540600
Brennan C. Platt, Murat R. Sertel, S. Nuray Akin
Publication date: 3 June 2011
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0106-7
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation ⋮ A cooperative bargaining framework for decentralized portfolio optimization
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