Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0093-8zbMath1213.91076OpenAlexW2122778713MaRDI QIDQ540605

Nadia Burani, Clara Ponsatí

Publication date: 3 June 2011

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0093-8

zbMATH Keywords

pairwise bargainingdecentralized tradecountervailing powerbilateral cartel formationCartel stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Stable Cartels

This page was built for publication: Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade