Incentive Effects of Multiple-Server Queueing Networks: The Principal-Agent Perspective

DOI10.4208/eajam.231010.260711azbMath1302.90043OpenAlexW2146360057MaRDI QIDQ5406904

Wai-Ki Ching, Min Huang, Ximin Huang, Sin-Man Choi

Publication date: 4 April 2014

Published in: Unnamed Author (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4208/eajam.231010.260711a

zbMATH Keywords

competitionNash equilibriumprincipal agentcapacity allocationMarkovian queueing systemsincentive theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (3)

Minimizing equilibrium expected sojourn time via performance-based mixed threshold demand allocation in a multiple-server queueing environment ⋮ A higher-order interactive hidden Markov model and its applications ⋮ Pooling Queues with Strategic Servers: The Effects of Customer Ownership

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• A Classified Bibliography of Research on Optimal Design and Control of Queues

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