When Does Compromise Prevent More Pollution?

DOI10.1090/NOTI893zbMATH Open1284.91438OpenAlexW1991286656MaRDI QIDQ5410091

Author name not available (Why is that?)

Publication date: 15 April 2014

Published in: Notices of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/noti893

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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