Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders

DOI10.1145/2213977.2214018zbMath1286.91057OpenAlexW2123999179MaRDI QIDQ5415492

Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date: 13 May 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2214018

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designauction theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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