On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design

DOI10.1145/2213977.2214019zbMath1286.90122arXiv1109.2067OpenAlexW2113939008MaRDI QIDQ5415493

Nicole Immorlica, Shuchi Chawla, Brendan Lucier

Publication date: 13 May 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.2067

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsmakespanmechanism designsocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

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