Budget feasible mechanism design
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Publication:5415494
DOI10.1145/2213977.2214020zbMath1286.91051arXiv1203.4455OpenAlexW4298053461MaRDI QIDQ5415494
Xiaohui Bei, Ning Chen, Pinyan Lu, N. V. Gravin
Publication date: 13 May 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.4455
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