scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297730

zbMath1288.91097MaRDI QIDQ5417648

Sayan Bhattacharya, Kamesh Munagala, Vincent Conitzer, Lirong Xia

Publication date: 22 May 2014

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonnumerical algorithms (68W05) Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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