Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations

DOI10.1515/mel-2013-0003zbMath1292.91063OpenAlexW1995860252MaRDI QIDQ5418022

Ahmed Doghmi

Publication date: 26 May 2014

Published in: Mathematical Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/mel-2013-0003

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementationprivate good economiessingle-dipped domain with indifferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

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