On optimal single-item auctions
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Publication:5419081
DOI10.1145/1993636.1993654zbMath1288.90087OpenAlexW1993197246MaRDI QIDQ5419081
George Pierrakos, Christos H. Papadimitriou
Publication date: 5 June 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993654
Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Distribution theory (60E99) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
Related Items (12)
Auction Design with a Revenue Target ⋮ On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design ⋮ Reverse auctions are different from auctions ⋮ Lookahead auctions with pooling ⋮ Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good ⋮ Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market ⋮ Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization ⋮ Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders ⋮ Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach ⋮ Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders
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