Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy

DOI10.1145/1993636.1993655zbMath1288.91102arXiv1011.2413OpenAlexW2021734699MaRDI QIDQ5419082

Hu Fu, Shahar Dobzinski, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.2413

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilitycombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Linear programming (90C05) Combinatorics in computer science (68R05) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

Related Items (13)

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms ⋮ Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations ⋮ On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design ⋮ Reverse auctions are different from auctions ⋮ Lookahead auctions with pooling ⋮ Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good ⋮ Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors ⋮ Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis ⋮ Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders

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