Mechanism design with uncertain inputs

DOI10.1145/1993636.1993709zbMath1288.91105OpenAlexW2127508398MaRDI QIDQ5419125

Moshe Tennenholtz, Uriel Feige

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993709

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessscheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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