Secure computation with information leaking to an adversary

DOI10.1145/1993636.1993731zbMath1288.94047OpenAlexW1980557401MaRDI QIDQ5419142

Miklós Ajtai

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1993636.1993731

zbMATH Keywords

Boolean circuitramsidechannel attack

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Complexity classes (hierarchies, relations among complexity classes, etc.) (68Q15)

Related Items (11)

Towards tight random probing security ⋮ How to Compute in the Presence of Leakage ⋮ A group identification protocol with leakage resilience of secret sharing scheme ⋮ Prouff and Rivain's formal security proof of masking, revisited. Tight bounds in the noisy leakage model ⋮ Dynamic random probing expansion with quasi linear asymptotic complexity ⋮ Unifying leakage models: from probing attacks to noisy leakage ⋮ Minimizing locality of one-way functions via semi-private randomized encodings ⋮ Unconditionally secure computation against low-complexity leakage ⋮ Correction to: ``Unconditionally secure computation against low-complexity leakage ⋮ On the power of expansion: more efficient constructions in the random probing model ⋮ Random probing security: verification, composition, expansion and new constructions

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