WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN

DOI10.1111/IERE.12060zbMath1294.91091OpenAlexW3124088600MaRDI QIDQ5420151

Anja Schöttner, Jenny Kragl

Publication date: 11 June 2014

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-259389

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (5)

Specialist vs. generalist: efficiency in multitasking ⋮ Salience bias and overwork ⋮ STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION ⋮ Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation ⋮ Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership

Cites Work

• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Minimum Wages and Employment

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