THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS AND CONVENTIONS UNDER LOCAL INTERACTIONS AND IMITATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198914500017zbMath1415.91008OpenAlexW3124531903MaRDI QIDQ5420658

Sebastian Ille

Publication date: 13 June 2014

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914500017

zbMATH Keywords

behaviorevolutionary gamessimulation modelingexistence and stability of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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